
HTTP Response Splitting





- HTTP Response Splitting is a protocol manipulation attack, similar to Parameter Tampering
- The attack is valid only for applications that use HTTP to exchange data
- Works just as well with HTTPS because the entry point is in the user visible data
- There are a number of variations on the attack

- An HTTP message response includes two parts :
 - Message Headers metadata that describes a request or response

Each terminated by a carriage return (\r) and a linefeed (\n)

GET http://www.google.com/ HTTP/1.1\r\n Host: www.google.com\r\n User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.0.1; Google-TR-5.7.806.10245-en) Gecko/2008070208 Firefox/3.0.1 Paros/3.2.13\r\n Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml; q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\r\n Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5\r\n Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7\r\n Keep-Alive: 300\r\n Proxy-Connection: keep-alive\r\n

• Then the Message Body which is the raw data of the response

<HTML>\r\n <HEAD>\r\n <TITLE>Your Title Here</TITLE>\r\n </HEAD>\r\n <BODY>\r\n </BODY>\r\n ... </HTML>\r\n

• The Message Headers are also separated from the message body a carriage return/linefeed pair

GET http://www.google.com/ HTTP/1.1 \r\n Host: www.google.com \r\n User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.0.1; Google-TR-5.7.806.10245-en) Gecko/2008070208 Firefox/3.0.1 Paros/3.2.13 \r\n Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 \r\n Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 \r\n Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 \r\n Keep-Alive: 300 \r\n Proxy-Connection: keep-alive \r\n <HTML> <HEAD> <TITLE>Your Title Here</TITLE>

- Those two consecutive carriage-return-linefeed pairs are the source of HTTP response splitting vulnerabilities
- The HTTP response splitting vulnerability is not the attack, it is simply the path that makes it possible
- The key to the attack is ability for an attacker to modify the message headers
- HTML is stateless, so neither the web server nor the browser has any problem with this seemingly odd behavior



- Let's understand how a normal page redirection works in HTTP
 - -Example: A page containing a redirect script:

protected void processRequest(HttpServletRequest aRequest, HttpServletResponse aResponse) throws ServletException, IOException {

redirect("http://www.new-url.com", aResponse);

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- -A request like:
- -would redirect to:

http://www.bank.com/offer.jsp?page=http://www.bank.com/freechecking

-How do the headers work behind the scenes?

http://www.bank.com/freechecking

• Under the hood, the request is

GET /latestoffer.jsp?page=http://www.bank.com/freechecking HTTP/1.1\r\n Host: www.bank.com \r\n

*r**n*

• The server responds with an HTTP 302 (redirect)

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Found \r\n
...
Location: http://www.bank.com/freechecking \r\n
NOTE: THIS COULD BE THE USER INPUT IN HEADER
...
\r\n
```

• The browser then fetches the new page

```
GET / HTTP/1.1 \r\n
Host: http://www.bank.com/freechecking \r\n
...
\r\n
```

• The server responds with HTTP 200 (found) and the page

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK \r\n
...
\r\n
```


• But the user can input something that terminates the response and initiates an attack

/latestoffer.jsp?page=foobar%0d%0aContent-Length:%200%0d%0d%0a%0aHTTP/1.1%20200%20OK%0d %0aContent-Type:%20text/html%0d%0a Content-Length:%2019%0d%0a%0d%0a<html>Attack</html>

%0d%0a is the URL encoding of the \r\n

Remember that you need two \r\n sequences between the headers and the body

• Which results in




- The dangerous part of this, is <<Anything you want>>
- A script that can take over the user's browser or steal cookie information
 - –A redirection to a different host and web page
 - -A page that mimics another site and collect credentials
 - -It can poison the web cache leading to site defacement
- However, the exploit is not complete
- There are now two responses, but only one request
- The web server will simply hold the second response

- The attacker has to issue another request
- In the simplest case, simply send http://www.bank.com
- How the attacker does this is dependent on the situation and the attackers goals
- See the following example of cache poisoning

HTTP Response Splitting The Attack – Cache Poisoning

- One goal of the attacker might be cache poisoning
 - -A site has a proxy server for web pages
 - -The attacker and victims are behind the proxy server



- When a response is received by the proxy server, it saves it to answer future requests
- –So the proxy server saves both responses from the attack
- If the second response defaces a real page, or creates a page with a malicious JavaScript embedded, everyone on the network will get it

HTTP Response Splitting

The Attack – Browser Cache Poisoning

 The attacker creates an HTTP Response Splitting attack based on a URL

http://somesite.com/start.php?first=xxx<script> ... </script>&lang=fr%0d%0aContent-Length:0%0d%0a HTTP/1.1%20200%20Found%0d%0aContent-Length:550%0d%0a ...

- and seduces a victim into clicking on it
- The web servers first response contains a Cross-site Scripting
 attack
- The script issues an Ajax request that sends the second request
- And the victim's web cache (and any proxy server) is poisoned

HTTP Response Splitting Consequences

- HTTP Response Splitting can lead to:
 - -Cross-site Scripting (XSS) attacks
 - -Cross User Defacement
 - -Web Cache Poisoning
 - Page Hijacking
 - -Browser Cache Poisoning
 - –Browser Hijacking



HTTP Response Splitting Discovery

- Check for any data outside of the Trust Boundary that is used in any HTTP header
 - -Try inserting a carriage return/linefeed pair to see it is allowed to pass through
 - -If so, you have a vulnerability
 - Be suspicious of redirects in code they often use information stored in the client
- Be aware that Post data can also be used in an attack
 - -It may be advantageous, because URL's have limited length
 - It requires that the attack be perpetrated via a script so it is more difficult to implement

HTTP Response Splitting Remediation

- If there are values outside the Trust Boundary that are used in HTTP messages,
 - –Validate the values by whitelisting

• They are only allowed to be certain values, nothing else

• For example, all language designators must be two alphabetic characters, exactly

- In the event that a subject parameter might be allowed to contain a CR/LF pair, URL encode all data in HTTP headers with the HTML entity reference $-\r => 8\#13$;
 - -\n =>

-This prevents them from being accepted as the control sequence \r\n

HTTP Response Splitting Avoidance

- Design Phase
 - Identify all application inputs that could be used in HTTP headers
 - -Specify secure coding guidelines for handling the data
 - Reduce the number of cases as much as possible to reduce the attack surface size
 - -Establish a test plan for validating that all cases are correctly remediated
 - If client-side data is used to redirect or modify the HTTP headers, remap the data to an ordinal set on the server side
 - $_{\odot}$ If there are 10 pages you can redirect to, change them to 'A' .. 'J' externally
 - $_{\odot}$ This is essentially a look up table and prevents the attacker's content from being used in an attack

HTTP Response Splitting Avoidance

- Implementation Phase
 - -All inputs must be validated
 - -Be aware of any use of input data in HTTP headers and code accordingly

• Testing Phase

Use dynamic analyzers to validate the application (they are good at finding this vulnerability)