CSCI 476: Computer Security

Lecture 8: Shellshock Attack (Part 1)


Reese Pearsall Spring 2023

Announcements


Lab 1 (Set-UID) due on Sunday 2/12


Lab 2 (Shellshock) due on **Sunday** 2/19


Learn about Gianforte Hall tomorrow





Our job is to unpack boxes we get from China, and sort the parts into the correct bins

















Our job is to unpack boxes we get from China, and sort the parts into the correct bins

You are assigned to check the robot parts and put them in the bin






You frequently notice that the head is missing certain parts or deformed, so it should not go into the bin



Our job is to unpack boxes we get from China, and sort the parts into the correct bins


You are assigned to check the robot parts and put them in the bin









We get lazy and we write a program to check



























You frequently notice that the head is missing certain parts or deformed, so it should not go into the bin








This will throw out any robots that has issues!


What would our program do or check for?

```
if (headHasErrors) {
           throwOut()
  else:
           putInBin()
  headHadErrors {
           if missing antenna:
                     return true
           if miscolor antenna:
                     return true
           return false
... right?
```











This will throw out any robots that has issues!

What would our program do or check for?

```
if (headHasErrors) {
         throwOut()
else:
         putInBin()
```

```
headHadErrors {
```

```
if missing antenna:
         return true
if miscolor antenna:
         return true
```

return false

```
... right?
```

Shellshock

A shell is a command-line interpreter

- Provides an interface between the user and OS
- There are different types of shell: sh, bash, csh, dash, etc

The **bash** shell is one of the most popular shell programs; often used in Linux OS

The Shellshock vulnerability (Lab 02) results from how **shell functions** and **environment variables** are handled in the bash shell

Shell Function

A **shell function** is a collection of commands to be executed under a certain name



We can use define a function a function, and declare it for use with the declare command

```
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ foo() { echo "I am a function!"; }
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ declare -f foo
foo ()
{
    echo "I am a function!"
}
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ foo
I am a function!
```

Shell Function

A **shell function** is a collection of commands to be executed under a certain name



We can also define the shell function as an **environment variable**


```
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ foo='() { echo "hello world"; }'
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ echo $foo
() { echo "hello world"; }
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ declare -f foo
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ export foo
```

Passing Shell Functions

Shell functions can be passed from process to process as environment variables

2. export foo

1. foo() { echo "hello";



```
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ foo='() { echo "hello world"; }'
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ echo $foo
() { echo "hello world"; }
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ declare -f foo
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ export foo
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ bash shellshock
                                                (Starts a new bash instance)
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ echo $foo (child process)
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ declare -f foo (child process)
foo ()
    echo "hello world"
[02/06/23] seed@VM:~$ foo (child process)
hello world
[02/06/23] seed@VM:~$ (child process)
```

Shell functions can be passed from process to process as environment variables

In the parent process, we defined the foo function as an environment variable

In the child process, it became a shell function (no longer an env var!)

```
Shell functions can be passed
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ foo='() { echo "hello world"; }'
                                                                     from process to process as
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ echo $foo
                                                                     environment variables
() { echo "hello world"; }
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ declare -f foo
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ export foo
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ bash shellshock
                                                    (Starts a new bash instance)
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ echo $foo (child process)
[02/06/23] seed@VM:~$ declare -f foo (child process)
                                                                     In the parent process, we defined
foo ()
                                                                    the foo function as an environment
                                                                    variable
    echo "hello world"
                                                                     In the child process, it became a
[02/06/23] seed@VM:~$ foo (child process)
                                                                    shell function (no longer an env
hello world
                                                                    var!)
[02/06/23] seed@VM:~$ (child process)
```

Important: Shell will parse <u>environment variables</u>, and if it finds a valid function definition, it will be converted to a <u>shell function</u>!

The Shellshock


Vulnerability



James Cook Oct 6, 2014, 3:55 AM

Security researcher Jonathan
Hall says he has found evidence
that Romanian hackers used
the Shellshock bug to gain
access to Yahoo servers,
according to a post on his
website Future South.





Hackers Are Already Using the Shellshock Bug to Launch Botnet Attacks

With a bug as dangerous as the "shellshock" security vulnerability discovered yesterday, it takes less than 24 hours to go from proof-of-concept to pandemic.

Shellshock was classified as being an extremely critical big. Low complexity and high potential damage

The

Shellshock

Vulnerability

(aka shellshock, bashbug, bashdoor)

- Disclosed Sept 24th, 2014
- This vulnerability exploited a mistake made by bash when it converts env.
 vars. to function defs
- Additional bugs were found in bash source code after disclosure of shellshock
- The bug has existed in bash source code since August of 1989

CVE-2014-6271: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-6271

We define a new environment variable that has a valid function definition, but we tack on an extra command (echo 'EVILLLL')

```
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ foo='() { echo "I am a function!"; }; echo "EVILLL";'
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ echo $foo
() { echo "I am a function!"; }; echo "EVILLL";
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ export foo
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ bash shellshock
```

We export it, and then create a new bash instance (aka a new child process)

(Remember: environment variables get inherited by a child process)

!!!! Our extra command we tacked on earlier gets executed by bash!

[02/06/23]seed@VM:~\$

!!!! Our extra command we tacked on earlier gets executed by bash!

Additionally, foo is now a function

[02/06/23]seed@VM:~\$

```
[02/06/23]<mark>seed@VM:~</mark>$ foo='() {    echo "I am a function!";    };    <mark>echo "EVILLL";'</mark>
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ echo $foo
() { echo "I am a function!"; }; echo "EVILLL";
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ export foo
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ bash shellshock
IFVTI I I
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ echo $foo
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$ declare -f foo
lfoo ()
    echo "I am a function!"
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~$
```

Due to a parsing bug when processing env. variables, bash executes trailing commands in env. variables



The shellshock bug starts in variables.c file in the bash source code

```
void initialize_shell_variables (env, privmode)
     char **env;
     int privmode;
  . . .
  for (string_index = 0; string = env[string_index++];) {
      . . .
      /* If exported function, define it now. Don't import
         functions from the environment in privileged mode. */
      if (privmode == 0 && read_but_dont_execute == 0 &&
             STREQN ("() {", string, 4)) {
         . . .
         // Shellshock vulnerability is inside:
                                                               2
         parse_and_execute(temp_string, name,
                      SEVAL_NONINT|SEVAL_NOHIST);
  (the rest of code is omitted)
```

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                      SEVAL NONINT | SEVAL NOHIST);
  (the rest of code is omitted)
```

If the first four characters of the environment variable are "() {", then parse and execute the command(s)

If bash thinks it finds an exported function, then it calls the function parse and execute() to parse the function definition

If the string contains a shell command (echo, rm, touch), then.....

If bash thinks it finds an exported function, then it calls the function parse and execute() to parse the function definition

If the string contains a shell command (echo, rm, touch), then..... Execute it!!!



If bash thinks it finds an exported function, then it calls the function parse and execute() to parse the function definition



Bash only looks at first four characters, and assumes everything after that is a valid function body with no extra shell commands (bad)

Bash identifies A as a function because of the leading "() {" and converts it to B

```
[A] foo=() { echo "hello world"; }; echo "extra";
[B] foo () { echo "hello world"; }; echo "extra";
```

In B, the string now becomes **two commands**

Consequences?

Bash identifies A as a function because of the leading "() { and converts it to B

```
[A] foo=() { echo "hello world"; }; echo "extra";
[B] foo () { echo "hello world"; }; echo "extra";
```

In B, the string now becomes **two commands**

Consequences?

Using environment variables, attackers can get a process to run **their commands**If a target process is a server process or runs with elevated privileges, bad things can happen

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In B, the string now becomes **two commands**

"Arbitrary code"


Consequences?

Using environment variables, attackers can get a process to run **their commands**If a target process is a server process or runs with elevated privileges, bad things can happen

The shellshock vulnerability is a bug in the code when converting environment variables to function definitions, which allows for an attacker to **execute arbitrary code**

Two conditions are needed to exploit the vulnerability
 The target process must run a vulnerable version of bash
 The target process gets untrusted user input via environment variables

Execute a bash shell
Trigger flawed parsing logic
Shellshock





Patches are available, but have they been applied to every system?

```
parse_and_execute (temp_string, name, SEVAL_NONINT|SEVAL_NOHIST);

+    /* Don't import function names that are invalid identifiers from the environment. */

+    if (legal_identifier (name))

+    parse_and_execute (temp_string, name, SEVAL_NONINT|SEVAL_NOHIST|SEVAL_FUNCDEF|SEVAL_ONECMD);
```

(New if statement that checks for only function definitions and executes one command)



DO NOT try a shellshock attack on a legitimate running server



(In our GitHub code repository)

```
[09/22/22]seed@VM:~/.../02_shellshock$ ls -al total 24 drwxrwxr-x 3 seed seed 4096 Sep 22 10:12 . drwxrwxr-x 12 seed seed 4096 Sep 22 10:12 ... -rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 395 Sep 22 10:12 docker-compose.yml drwxrwxr-x 2 seed seed 4096 Sep 22 10:12 image_www -rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 4430 Sep 22 10:12 README.md
```



(In our GitHub code repository)

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[09/22/22]seed@VM:~/.../02_shellshock$ ls -al total 24 drwxrwxr-x 3 seed seed 4096 Sep 22 10:12 . drwxrwxr-x 12 seed seed 4096 Sep 22 10:12 ... -rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 395 Sep 22 10:12 docker-compose.yml drwxrwxr-x 2 seed seed 4096 Sep 22 10:12 image_www -rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 4430 Sep 22 10:12 README.md
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
Folder that contains the contents for our web server



(In our GitHub code repository)

```
[09/22/22]seed@VM:~/.../02_shellshock$ ls -al total 24 drwxrwxr-x 3 seed seed 4096 Sep 22 10:12 . drwxrwxr-x 12 seed seed 4096 Sep 22 10:12 .. -rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 395 Sep 22 10:12 docker-compose.yml drwxrwxr-x 2 seed seed 4096 Sep 22 10:12 image_www -rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 4430 Sep 22 10:12 README.md
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
Script that will create a docker container that will manage our web server




Docker

Docker is an open-source platform for building, deploying and managing containerized applications

containers use the docker platform, which uses the host operating system



virtual machines all have their own operating system



Host (Your actual computer) **SEED Labs VM ("Guest")** 10.0.2.11 **Docker Container (web server)** 10.9.0.80 (www.seedlab-shellshock.com)

Setting up your Docker container

```
cd /to/folder/with/docker-compose-yml #go to directory with build script
docker-compose up -d #start up webserver. -d to run in background
curl http://www.seedlab-shellshock.com/cgi-bin/vul.cgi#verify it works
```

docker-compose up -d is used to start the web server (-d stands for "detached" and lets the web server run in the background)

docker-compose down #turns the server off

docker ps -a #view active containers and their ids

docksh <id>#connect/log in to a container

```
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~/.../02_shellshock$ docker-compose up -d
Creating victim-10.9.0.80 ... done
```

```
[02/06/23]seed@VM:~/.../02_shellshock$ docker ps -a
CONTAINER ID IMAGE COMMAND CREATED STATUS PORTS NAMES
3c7859dbd392 seed-image-www-shellshock "/bin/sh -c 'service..." 7 seconds ago Up 6 seconds victim-10.9.0.80
```

[02/06/23]seed@VM:~/.../02_shellshock\$ docksh 3c7

root@3c7859dbd392:/# whoami

root

root@3c7859dbd392:/#

We are now logged into the docker container!

(You don't need to provide the full container ID)